Available purely software based code attestation protocols have recently been shown to be cheatable. In this work we propose to upload compressed instruction code to make the code attestation protocol robust against a so called compresssion attack. The described secure code attestation protocol makes use of recently proposed micro-controller architectures for reading out compressed instruction code. We point out that the proposed concept only makes sense if the provided cost/benefit ratio for the aforementioned microcontroller is higher than an alternative hardware based solution requiring a tamper-resistant hardware module.
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of the ubiquitous computing vision towards full-fledged real world applications faces a diversity of new problems. Besides other issues and due to the fact that for many applications due to the large number of involved end-devices cost-efficient hardware is an issue, one can not guarantee that a code image which once has been uploaded on a tiny, non-tamper resistant device, will always run in a correct and un-manipulated way. Even worse, it may behave in a Byzantine manner such that the device sometimes behaves correctly and sometimes behaves incorrectly.
One strategy to control respectively detect such misbehaving nodes in a sensor network, or, more generally, in an M2M setting, is to run from time to time a challenge-response protocol between the restricted device and a master device -the verifier -that is sending the challenge.
However, recently it has been shown that purely software based code attestation [5] , [4] , [6] is vulnerable against a set of attacks. Basically one can subdivide code attestation techniques into two subsets: the first class of approaches is using challenge-response protocols in conjunction with harsh timing restrictions for the restricted device's response. Otherwise an attacker could simply load the original code image into the external memory and save program memory for his own bogus code. Each time the master device triggers the code attestation protocol, for the computation of the response the cheated prover device reads the original program from the external memory. Since reading from external memory is much more time consuming, a timing restriction at the verifier for the duration between sending the challenge message and receiving the response message can detect this. The second proposed class of countermeasures randomly fills empty program memory to avoid that such free memory space can be used to infect the device with bogus code. In their landmark work [7] , Castelluccia et al. have shown that both types of aforementioned countermeasures can be circumvented. Later we provide more details on this. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the adversary model. Section 3 describes the so called compression attack the attacker can perform to break recently proposed code attestation protocols. In Section 4 we propose our countermeasure to deal with compression attacks and in Section 5 we give insights how to execute compressed instruction code as necessary requirement for this approach. Section 6 discusses suitable compression algorithms and in Section 7 we provide the security analysis of the proposed solution. Conclusions and open issues are presented in Section 8.
ADVERSARY MODEL
After node deployment and before the first round of the attestation protocol starts, the attacker has full control over all device memories such that he can modify program memory or any other memories like e.g. the external memory. At attestation time, when the challenge-response based attestation protocol is running, the attacker has no physical control over the restricted device anymore. However, please note that the device may yet run malicious code. It is up to the code attestation protocol to detect this independently of the fact that the attacker may find ways to store the original uploaded code image at a different memory than the program memory. Note that we do not consider fluctual data memory. Control Flow Integrity could prevent attacks that use techniques like Return-Oriented Programming [7] , [10] , [11] . Obviously, during the phase in which the attacker has full control over the restricted device, the attacker is also able to either modify the code for the code-attestation protocol itself or to read out any sensitive data like e.g. preshared keys in case the code attestation protocol would be based on this.
COMPRESSION ATTACK
One major challenge for a purely software-based code attestation for embedded devices is the so called compression attack. This attack cheats a basic challenge-response based code attestation as follows: the originally uploaded program which shall temporarily be checked by the attestation protocol to be exclusively stored in the program memory is subsequently compressed by the attacker. Depending on the concrete compression algorithm and according to the actual uploaded code image for a given application the compression gain ranges from 12% up to 47% [7] . An attacker can use such free program memory to store and run bogus code on the node's program memory. Note that current solutions for secure code-attestation also propose to fill the free program memory with pseudorandomly generated words instead of the default entry 0FF. This defends against an attacker who could use this previously unused memory for uploading a bogus code image in an undetected way. Since the aforementioned pseudorandomly generated words are required to be part of the response of a code attestation protocol, the verifier needs to know respectively may be able to compute such pseudorandomly generated words.
However, Castelluccia et al. have shown that cheating such kinds of attestation protocols is still possible: whenever the restricted device (prover) receives a nonce from the master device (verifier) it decompresses the earlier compressed original program on-the-fly and subsequently computes the hash value x = h(nonce||CI|| P RW ) by applying the hash function h(). The x is the checksum respectively the response of the challenge-response protocol. The CI denotes the originally uploaded code image and the P RW is the pseudorandomly filled content within the remaining free program memory at load-time. Obviously this simple challenge-response based code attestation fails: Whenever the prover receives a fresh nonce (the master device initiated the code attestation protocol), the attacker decompresses the compressed CI and writes it into the program memory again. This provides all the relevant input parameters for the computation of the hash function, namely the CI, the nonce, and the P RW such that the master device subsequently receives the response x within a given time interval which it verifies to be correct. Finally note that, to save his own bogusly uploaded code image CI, the attacker could have stored CI also within the external memory. Subsequently to the time-critical code attestation phase, he has enough time to again compress the CI and read CI from external memory to program memory.
ATTESTATION OF COMPRESSED INSTRUCTION CODE
Our countermeasure against uploading malicious code into the program memory and subsequently not being able to detect this, re-uses and adapts earlier proposed code attestation protocols [4] , [5] , [6] by at the same time using i. a hardware extension at the micro-controller, and ii. fulfilling a strict policy for uploading CIs into the program memory.
This policy is to only upload a yet compressed code image C(CI) into the program memory and to fill the remaining part with P RW 1 . Consequently, the attacker cannot allocate such easily free program memory anymore to tracelessly upload malicious code by applying the above described compression attack. Note that with the proposed approach the challenge (a fresh nonce) which goes into the hash computation for every run of the code-attestation anew, enforces the prover to always compute the hash value (response) with a compressed CI and P RW anew. In our proposed setting the response x thus is computed as h(nonce||C(CI)||P RW ) where the C is a properly chosen lossless data compression algorithm. More details on the properties of the chosen lossless data compression algorithm C and other refinements on C(CI) will be provided later. The adapted code attestation protocol is shown in Figure 1 (Option 1).
Please note that still with our proposed adapted code attestation protocol allowing to upload only a compressed code image into the program memory it is essential to enforce a runtime restriction as a countermeasure against an attack in which the original code image or parts of it are shifted to the external memory. We term ǫ as the duration of the time interval [t0, t1] measured by the local clock of the verifier. The t0 denotes the sending time of the challenge nonce and the t1 denotes the receiving time of the response x. We emphasize that a proper choice of the threshold Tem with ǫ < Tem is prover device-dependent to defend the approach against attacks using the external memory of the prover device.
EXECUTION OF COMPRESSED INSTRUCTION CODE
Now that an attacker cannot such easily cheat the codeattestation protocol anymore by simply compressing the originally uploaded code image and subsequently decompressing it if needed, the remaining problem with this approach is how to run compressed code? To solve this issue one needs Micro-controller architecture with compressed code memory and dictionary memory [8] .
to incorporate a hardware extension at the micro-controller. Please note that the approach to upload a compressed code image into the program memory is not new. It has recently been proposed by Yamada et al. [8] . Early work on this can be found in [1] .
However, originally it has been proposed with the objective to offer a high compression ratio and a fast instruction expendability -and not as a building block to protect against a bogus code image in the program memory like we are proposing. Envisioned is a program memory which includes a dictionary memory or other means to start the decompression operation. This component is responsible for storing instruction codes which appear in a typical program image. Figure 2 illustrates the micro-controller architecture which is proposed in [8] . Another compression technique based on a dictionary has been presented by Lefurgy et al. in [2] .
So we propose to only allow to load yet compressed code into the program memory and to decompress the code at runtime. The decompression unit is located at the program memory with a controller passing compressed code instructions to the dictionary memory. This architecture can be used to support the defense against attacks where free program memory space can be generated by compressing the originally uploaded code image and filling this gap with malicious code (including the compression/decompression function). A code attestation protocol based on simply hashing the original code image plus the remaining free program memory space would not detect such an attack.
Some Remarks: The dictionary memory as well as the compressed code memory are regions within the program memory. Thus, in particular the dictionary memory is no dedicated memory module, neither separated nor protected in a specific manner. Consequently, an attacker could either fully overwrite or partially modify the dictionary memory.
To be able to subsequently decompress the CI at runtime we are not allowed to compress the dictionary (dic) itself. We refine the computation of the response x such that:
This additional consideration of the dictionary has also been reflected within Figure 1 (Option 2a).
CHOICE OF THE DATA COMPRESSION ALGORITHM 6.1 Envisioned Properties
The proper choice of a suitable lossless data compression algorithm C is essential with respect to the proposed security architecture. We need to find a lossless data compression algorithm which shall provide the following partially conflicting properties:
1. a high compression ratio for a typical CI (compared to competing lossless data compression algorithms);
2. very fast decompression (vice versa the performance of the compression operation can be relatively poor);
3. the overall decompression concept is required to support entry-points at which the decompression operation can start;
With respect to property number one we state that it is one of the properties of any lossless data compression algorithm that for typical input files containing many frequently used data chunks the compression rate is rather high. However, vice versa if the input file contains many seldomly used data chunks the resulting compression ratio is rather poor. Moreover, the compression algorithm C h chosen by the honest party should ideally provide the highest compression rate compared to other compression candidates, e.g. Ca chosen by the attacker. Otherwise the attacker could apply Ca(C h (CI)) to save program memory for CI.
The second property is required since decompression of a code image instruction should ideally not delay the execution of the originally loaded program. On the contrary there is no technical requirement that restricts the compression time before uploading the CI.
Entry points which define the positions at which the decompression operation starts to decompress the next code instruction can be either chosen to be placed at fix positions of the compressed CI, with a fix and equal distance for a compressed chunk representing a single code image instruction. This can be achieved by using a dictionary. A complementary approach would be to allow entry points at variable positions supporting compression chunks with different sizes. Clearly the latter provides a better compression ratio at the cost of a higher management effort for finding the next entry-point. A cache together with a line address table (LAT) are frequently used for this [1] . Note that cache and LAT can be independently applied of the concretely chosen compression algorithm. For this reason we prefer a LAT instead of a dictionary. Our choice has been reflected in Figure 2 . 
Candidates
Initially we considered Canonical Huffman Encoding (CHE) [3] as lossless data compression algorithm C with canonical Huffman tree. To handle entry points at variable positions with the objective to provide a higher compression rate we use a LAT as a list of entry points. Note that with this approach a dictionary memory is not required anymore such that in Figure 1 Option 2b becomes valid:
Also, since each entry is listed only one time within the LAT, later we show that the attacker does not succeed in sufficiently compressing the LAT. It turns out that to a large degree this is also true in case the attacker tries to compress the canonical Huffman tree. However, the disadvantage of the CHE for our purposes is its relatively small gain of compression results on MicaZ with on average 12.19% for various typical WSN programs [7] . For comparison, the lossless data compression algorithm Prediction by Partial Matching (PPM) provides an average gain of 47.45% for typical WSN applications. Unfortunately, such a significant gain difference of the compression algorithms CHE and P P M again opens the door for an attack to make use of this gain difference of approximately 35%. The attacker can apply P P M on the compressed code image CCHE(CI) and again generate free space for his own bogus malicious code in either of the two ways:
CHE (CCHE(CI))) C −1 denotes the decompression operation. Due to the aforementioned reason we also analyzed Deflate, ZPAQ and further derivates of PPM, namely PZIP and PPMZ. Please note that the hardware supported compression scheme proposed by Wolf et al. [1] doesn't limit the set of lossless compression algorithms. It only limits the blocksize s h , which has to be equal to the available cache size (s h = |cache|). Nevertheless, if the attacker chooses a much smaller block size the compression ratio will suffer. Therefore, when we compress the CI with a larger block size the attacker is forced to use a larger block size as well. Since the decompression of larger blocks increases the overhead, the time necessary for decompression is increased as well, especially on low-performance platforms like sensor nodes. This fact becomes significant if we take into account that the attestation has to run in a pseudrandomly manner with nonce as the seed for a PRNG forcing a strict ordering of the CI's words when calculating the response x [9] . It forces the attacker to decompress each block approximately sa times. Moreover, this disables the attacker to apply a compression algorithm Ca that sacrifices performance for higher compression ratios since the overhead increases for larger block sizes sa recognizably. Therefore, the use of such algorithms is easily detectable with the choice of a large block size s h and a threshold Tpm as the upper duration for performing compression attacks on the program memory. Obviously, ǫ < min{Tem, Tpm} with Tpm > Tem as we will see. Figure 4 shows the amount of temporarily decompressed data during the attestation, which increases for larger block sizes. The attacker has to read about sa·|Ca(CI)| bytes from the program memory during the attestation if he compressed the full CI previously. If the attacker chooses the block size to be sa = 2048 bytes and Ca to be PZIP, he will have to read up to 37M B from program memory to decompress all blocks sa times and subsequently be able to calculate x. This is a huge overhead compared to |CI| = 25.9KB. For the attacker, obviously this huge amount of data is an immense burden in particular on platforms with low bandwidth for reading from program memory. While platforms capable of reading 50M B/s result in less than 1 second timing overhead for 2048 byte blocks, platforms capable of reading only 1M B/s require up to 40 seconds and thus are easily detectable by the proposed attestation protocol.
Obviously, these overhead to decompress every block sa times impacts the time necessary for the attacker to calculate the valid response x for the attestation protocol significantly on restricted platforms. As an uncompromised node doesn't have to calculate C −1 h (C h (CI)) at attestation time, i.e. decompress the compressed program image, the block size enables us to raise and adjust the overhead for the attacker by orders of magnitude to let us discover the existence of the attacker reliably through a proper choice for the devicedependent value of ǫ. However, a larger cache size respectively s h slow down the on-the-fly decompression routine during normal operation of the restricted device. On the other hand a larger cache decreases the number of cache misses. Therefore a necessary decompression is more seldom for a larger cache size, but takes more time to complete.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our security analysis considers six attack vectors, namely 7.1 decompressing the code image, 7.2 attacks on the LAT, 7.3 attacks by using the external memory, 7.4 replay attacks, 7.5 node depletion attacks, and, finally 7.6 DoS attacks.
Decompressing the Code Image
The attacker is able to decrease the timing overhead by exploiting the fact that different blocks can be compressed with different compression ratios. Therefore, the attacker could pick only those blocks which provide the best compression ratios out of all blocks until he gains sufficient memory to store his bogus code. Since the blocks are yet compressed with a properly chosen lossless compression algorithm, each of them provides a similar compression ratio. To overcome this issue, the attacker could first calculate C −1 h (C h (CI)), i.e. decompress the compressed CI and compress it for his own afterwards, i.e. calculate Ca(C −1 h (C h (CI))). During the attestation he then has to calculate C h (C −1 a (Ca(CI))) to pass the attestation. Therefore this method further increases the overhead for the attacker, especially if we choose a (C h , s h ) that compresses rather slowly. Moreover, the attacker's possible gain is expected to be low, because blocks which provide a good compression ratio to the attacker will provide a good compression ratio to us as well.
However, even without calculating C −1 h (C h (CI)) the attacker still requires to compress only as much blocks as he needs to gain enough free memory for the CI. The exact number of blocks an attacker has to use depends on our choice of (C h , s h ) as well as the attacker's choice (Ca, sa) and, obviously | CI| itself. Please note that besides the CI the attacker has to also store the code of the decompression routine C −1 a and the LATa within the program memory. As Castelluccia et al. have to spend 1707 bytes for a huffman decompression routine [7] used in their compression attack, which is a relatively simple algorithm compared to the compression algorithms proposed in this paper, we force the attacker to compress at least multiple blocks to get a chance to gain enough space for his needs. In general, the attacker has to compress
where
on average with
and #Blocks total = |CI| sa .
The memory overhead then is about #Blocks·sa· |Ca(CI)| |CI| ·sa. We assume the attacker has to store at least 1KB of data 2 , i.e. | CI| + |C −1 a | + |LATa| = 1KB and he will calculate C −1 h (C h (CI)) before compressing CI for his own. For example, if we choose (C h = P ZIP, s h = 512 bytes) and the attacker chooses (Ca = P P M Z, sa = 2048 bytes) the attacker's memory overhead is about 17.3M B. Figure 5 shows the attacker's possible choices for (Ca, sa) to gain sufficient memory whereas C h = P ZIP with varying s h is our choice of a compression algorithm. For the attacker's choices we focus on compression algorithms mentioned in this paper only, namely PZIP, PPMZ, ZPAQ and Deflate for block sizes ranging from 64 bytes to 2048 bytes. On platforms capable of reading 1M B/s of data from program memory, we argue that memory overhead above 5M B is easily detectable since it slows down the attestation for about 5 seconds. Therefore even if we choose rather small block sizes of s h ≥ 256 bytes the attack is still detectable. Please note that we do not even take the CPU overhead into account here. From a security point of view we argue to always use the largest possible block size s h . In practice cache sizes above 1KB are hardly feasible, especially on embedded devices with less than 4KB of data memory. Therefore we propose to choose (C h , s h ≥ 512 bytes). Please note that other combinations will be totally feasible as well, but one has to choose s h for other compression algorithms more carefully.
Attacks on the LAT
The countermeasure to the compression attack is the compression of the CI with a suitable data compression algorithm as discussed in Section 7.1. Thus, the only remaining non-compressed data besides the P RW which has been argued to be not effectively compressable is the LAT h . Consequently, if the (C h , s h ) for compressing the CI has been chosen properly, the only remaining compression attack is to compress the LAT h itself to save program memory (Ca(LAT h )). If the attacker succeeds in saving enough program memory out of this to additionally store a bogus code image CI and at the same time requires ǫ < min{Tem, Tpm}, the attack is successful and not detectable by our code attestation protocol. However, recall that a lossless data compression algorithm does not provide the same compression ratio for every ingoing uncompressed data; in particular a LAT due to its condensed form can not significantly be compressed as we will see. Moreover, we state that typically it holds |LAT h | << |CI| and |CI| ≤ |P RW | 3 . In general, the number of entries of a LAT can be computed as #Entries(LAT ) = |CI| s
So, even if Ca(LAT h ) and Ca(CI) with (Ca, sa) would provide the same compression ratio, which obviously is not the case, the absolute gain of program memory for an attacker who purely can compress the remaining uncompressed LAT h would be significantly smaller. E.g. we assume an embedded device with 128KB of program memory where |CI| = 25.9KB (multi-hop oscilloscope). We further assume single LAT entries to be coded using 24 bits, i.e. |LAT h | = #Entries(LAT h ) · 3 bytes for the proposed block size s h = 512 bytes. The LAT h then occupies 153 bytes. Compression results for the LAT h of our benchmark applications are listed in Table I . For this setting and by applying our countermeasure an attacker's absolute gain of free program memory to upload a bogus code image CI would shrink below 5 bytes approximately 4 whereas in the absence of our proposed solution the attacker could occupy approximately up to 17KB of the program memory without being detectable.
Again, with a larger choice of the block size s h one could reduce the free memory space for an attacker even more. Furthermore, in case the CI is smaller also the LAT h shrinks. E.g. if CI is the BaseStation respectively Sense applica-tion and the block size again is s h = 512 bytes, the attacker will not gain free memory by compressing the LAT h of size 90 respectively 18 bytes using the compression algorithms mentioned in this paper. Finally, the attacker could overwrite the LAT h within the program memory for his own bogus code; in equivalence to the other program memory containing compressed code and P RW this attack is detected by the computation and subsequent verification of x = h(nonce||C h (CI)||LAT h ||P RW ). [12] , [6] 16948 7029 1124
Attacks using External Memory
The proposed solution detects attacks by the usage of external memory with the introduction of a device-dependent threshold ǫ < Tem. Since the threshold should be as harsh as possible there will definetively be cases in which a false negative will be the result of a single code attestation run. Nevertheless we recommend to choose the Tem as harsh as possible to indeed have a meaningful countermeasure against an attack in which the attacker makes use of the external memory. As a consequence, in case of a false negative one should repeat the code attestation protocol n times where n is factor two the number of protocol runs in which the received x does not match to the computation at the verifier. To restrict the number of iterations for the code attestation protocol for a single code attestation phase we recommend to stop the protocol in case two times the received response x (each time with a different nonce) has been presented.
Replay Attacks
As long as the challenge nonce is always fresh replay attacks are not possible. Consequently the size of the nonce is a function over the lifetime of the (frequently) battery-driven prover and the frequency of applying the code attestation protocol. For example if the approximate lifetime of the prover is 3 month and the verifier starts the code attestation protocol once per hour we state |nonce| should not be smaller than four bytes (this is required to correspond to the n chosen in 7.3). The attacker can eavesdrop over the wireless all transmitted pairs (noncei, xi) with the objective to resend yet eavesdropped responses xi. Since the nonce is the only data chunk providing freshness for the response computation, once a nonce noncer is repeatedly transmitted by the verifier the attacker can use the time slot ǫ to upload CI. However, a more realistic attack arises in case of a poor implementation of the 'random' choice of a nonce at the verifier side. If the attacker can infer from pairs (nonce1, x1), ..., (noncer, xr) to noncer+1 he can precompute xr+1 and the time to upload and run CI extends from ǫ to the duration until the next run of the code attestation protocol. However, running bogus code during the time interval of two consecutive sent challenge nonces noncei and noncei+1 is always possible even without performing such a replay attack. Thus, a proper implementation of the freshness function has to ensure that the attacker cannot even infer a sequence of consecutive nonces noncei, ..., noncei+j with j > 1 allowing to run bogus code undetected during an interval [i, i + j].
Node Depletion Attacks
If the attacker aims at wasting the energy of the non-tamper resistant and restricted prover device he could masquerade as the master device and continiously send challenges nonce. Two countermeasures are possible here: firstly, one could introduce a master key k which is shared between the master device and the prover device such that x = h k (nonce||C h (CI)||LAT h ||P RW ). The h k () denotes a keyed MAC. However, obviously this approach contradicts with the fact that initially the attacker has full control over the non-tamper resistant device such that the k can be read out for subsequent depletion attacks. Due to this reason we propose a lightweight approach in which the prover device computes and sends at maximum n times per epoch a response x. Here n corresponds to the number of iterations recommended under 7.3.
Other Attacks: DoS
The protocol is not resistant against DoS attacks. To sufficiently handle depletion attacks or attacks on the usage of the external memory an attacker can always enforce the code attestation protocol to stop. In such situations the master device considers the code image running on the prover device as bogus.
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN ISSUES
The work at hand presents a code attestation protocol which in particular detects compression attacks aiming to run bogus code in an undetected manner. The code image is loaded in a compressed manner. Only LAT and P RW are loaded uncompressed. The presented approach is work in progress. Surely, more elaborated analysis are required on a proper choice of parameters like s h , Tpm and n. Also the role of the cache needs to be evaluated more in depth with respect to potential security weaknesses.
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